We continue the analysis of quantum-like description of markets and economics. The approach has roots in the recently developed quantum game theory and quantum computing. The present paper is devoted to quantum bargaining games which are a special class of quantum market games without institutionalized clearinghouses.
Quantum bargaining
There have recently been important changes in the paradigms of economics: economists discuss the role of the Heisenberg uncertainty relation [1] or even dare claim that quantum mechanics and mathematical economics are isomorphic [2] . These shocking changes have probably been brought about by the emergence of econophysics. Research on quantum computation and quantum information allows to extend the scope game theory for the quantum world [3, 4] . Among various proposed qualitative scientific methods only quantum theory does not allow to take no account of the news phenomenon so persistent in social sciences [5] . Therefore the quantum-like description of market phenomena has a remarkable chance of gaining favourable reception from the experts. On the other hand only thorough investigation may reveal if economics already is in or would ever enter the domain of quantum theory. The present authors have given a general description of quantum market games (q-games) in a recent paper, [6] . Among them one may distinguish the class of quantum transactions (qtransactions) that is q-games without institutionalized clearinghouses. This class comprises quantum bargaining (q-bargaining) which are discussed in the present paper and quantum auction (q-auction) to be discussed in a separate paper. The participants of a q-bargaining game will be called Alice ( ) and Bob ( ). We will suppose that they settle beforehand who is the buyer (Alice) and who is the seller (Bob). A two-way q-bargaining that is a q-bargaining when the last condition is not fulfilled, will be analyzed in a separate paper. Alice enter into negotiations with Bob to settle the price for the transaction. Therefore the proper measuring apparatus consists of the pair of traders in question. In q-auction the measuring apparatus consists of a one side only, the initiator of the auction.
The Riemann sphere of polarization states
We will identify the space of Alice polarization states with the one dimensional complex projective space È ½ . Points in È ½ will be called polarizations (or q-bits [7] ). We will use the projective coordinates ´ ¼ ½ µ. In fact, we will introduce a two dimensional Hilbert space À × and choose an orthonormal basis´ ¼ ½ µ, 
where Á is the unit matrix. This representation is referred to as the Stokes parametrization [8] and is the inverse one to the Cayley-Kleina parametrization´2µ. We will use the following interpretation of the Alice polarization state ¾ À × (that is of her strategy). If she formulates the conditions of the transaction we say she has the polarization ½ (and is in the state Ö ½ ). In q-bargaining this means that she put forward the price.
In the opposite case, when she decides if the transaction is made or not, A market process resulting in q-bargaining is described by a projection
The result of the projection depends on the choice of the basis´ ¼ ½ µ (it is sufficient to point out the vector ¼ ). We will suppose that the polarization of q-bargaining is determined by the pair of participants in a unique way.
This polarization space has a fascinating connection to Lorentzian geometry (special relativity). We cannot help noting here that, according to Penrose [20, 21] , È ½ ³ Ë ¾ may be identified with the heavenly sphere of light rays coming to an observer. The group of conformal transformations of the Riemannn sphere È Ë Ä¾ µ is isomorphic to the proper Lorentz group Ë Ç ¼´¿ ½µ that preserves the Minkowski metric. Penrose have also shown that the points on the heavenly sphere may be obtained from spinors so that any point on the heavenly sphere corresponds to a proposition specifying the state of a spinor ( in the space of propositions in the quantum logic associated to the Jordan algebra ¾´ µ).
The arguments given in the following paragraph show that the state ¼½ is more profitable for Alice than the state ½¼ . The skill of replication of the vector ¼ would allow Alice avoiding winding up in the state ½¼ . But quantum cloning is not possible [9] and this makes the quantum bargaining nontrivial and very interesting. It seems worth to notice that although the polarization state cannot be cloned it may be transferred. We may by using classical and quantum communication channels [10, 11] teleport Alice polarization state to another q-bargaining site. In that way Alice may enter into negotiation with Bill instead of Bob. Nevertheless, she will not be able to accomplish both transaction simultaneously. This seems to be natural if one recalls the common belief in undividity of attention. Alice however may multiply her profits during a fixed interval by using financial oscillators [12] . To this end she must be able to master validity times of various financial instruments bought or sold in q-bargaining at different times.
We will say that Alice polarization dominates Bob' one ( ½ ) during q-bargaining with the polarization ¼ if the probability of being in the state ¼ is greater for Alice than for Bob, that is If domination results in profit asymmetry among participants (see below) then traders buying or selling, say, shares issued by companies belonging to Alice, Bob and Carol may be perceived as if playing an RPS game. A quantum version of the RPS game is discussed by Iqbal and Tool [13] . They showed that contrary to the classical case there is a stable Nash equilibrium in the quantum RPS game. The observed non-transitivity of dominance in bargaining is a case in point for using quantum description of bargaining. Empirical verification should decide if such approach is correct. Of course, one may tray to realize q-bargaining games on quantum level where both parties may be formed by coalitions and the appropriate states would be superpositions of states of the members but this is beyond the scope of the present analysis.
Rationality of decisions of making bargain
Let us recall that the Alice strategy is, besides its polarization
given by the supply-demand factor ¾ À [6] . The total state of qbargaining, © Note that that the supply of an asset at the price may be perceived as demand of money for which one pays a definite amount of the asset equal to ½ . Therefore there is no minus sign in the definition of the random variable Ô . The axioms of quantum theory say that the probability density of revealing Alice and Bob intentions described by the random variables Õ and Ô , respectively, is given by
where Õ is the probability amplitude of offering the price Õ 
If we change the convention so that the variable Õ describes profits of the trading with Alice party instead of hers then the condition´5µ takes the form Õ · Ô ¼ with accordingly changed interpretation of Ô .
Let us use the convenient Iverson notation [15] in which ÜÔÖ ×× ÓÒ denotes the logical value (1 or 0) of the sentence ÜÔÖ ×× ÓÒ. The logarithm of the transaction price, ÐÒ is the random variable Õ or Ô depending on the polarization of the transaction ( ½¼ or ¼½ , respectively) restricted by the condition´5µ. Therefore to obtain the probability density in the state ½¼ we have to integrate over Ô the density given by Eq.´4µ multiplied by Note that these distribution are not yet correctly normalized.
The case when Alice bargains with the Rest of the World
Let us now consider the possible influence of changes in the price character of strategies of bargaining parties on their profits. The analysis of Nash equilibrium states [16] of participants changing their polarizations via strategies being unitary homographies on È ½ i È ½ will be presented in a separate work. To illustrate the course of q-bargaining and the resulting profits let us consider a simple model. Suppose that Alice state is given by a wave function being a proper function of the demand operator [6] . Then the probability density Õ ¾ , see Eq.´7µ and´9µ, is given by Dirac delta function AE´Õ µ. We interpret it as the strategy I buy only if the price lower than (therefore we call the value the withdrawal price). Let now Carol represent the Rest of the World (ÊÏ) strategy [6] that is a market on which the good Alice is going to buy fulfills the demand-supply law (is not a giffen [6] ). Then, according to the theorem discussed in Ref. [6] , the probability density The integrals of´10µ and´11µ over ÐÒ ¾´ ½ ½µ represent the probability of making q-transaction ´ ÐÒ · ¼ µ (equal for both polarizations ½¼ and ¼½ ). The time of waiting for accomplishment of the transaction is a random variable with a geometrical distribution [14] and does not depend on polarization. Its expectation value is equal to
where is the characteristic (mean) time of duration of q-bargaining [14] . Eq.´12µ respects the time Alice needs for selling the good (also equal to ).
This is a consequence of her strategy AE´Õ µ. The profit Alice made in a sequence identical of q-bargaining is measured by the profit intensity equal to [16] Ô ½¼ ½¼´Ð Ò µ · ½ Ô ½¼ µ ¼½´Ð Ò µ ´ µ This value has the property of being a fixed point of the function ´ µ ( is a contraction almost everywhere) [14] . Therefore if Alice does not know the parameters of the ÊÏ distribution her best method of achieving the condition ¼ ¾ ¼ ¿ in a polarization state ¼½ is the simple iteration ´ µ leading to selfcorrecting optimal algorithm for getting the withdrawal price . In the discussed q-bargaining the polarization ¼½ is more profitable for Alice than ¼½ . The characteristics of q-bargaining are presented in Fig. 1 (diagram 
Temperatures of mixtures of q-bargaining
General quantum bargaining involves mixed strategies and therefore should be described in terms of probability density matrix (operator) defined 
where ÌÖ denotes trace and ¬ × ¾Ê is the inverse of spin temperature of the system described by the density operator ¬× Ö . The above formula may be simplified by substitution [17] .) As a result the optimal value of the parameter of Alice strategy will be shifted towards zero. Alice, to correct her strategy, have to start a new iterative procedure to find the new optimal value of and this will enlarge dispersion of her strategy (¬ ½ Alice ¼). This process resembles heat transfer from a hot thermostat (ÊÏ) to a cold one (Alice). As a result the thermostat ÊÏ cools down. Alice gets warmer and subsequently while finding new value of lowers her temperature (and entropy).
If we introduce a mechanism of coupling polarization of ÊÏ with its demand-supply part ´Ôµ being an integral Wigner function with Gibbs weights [6] , we would get a model analogous to spin system interacting with phonon thermostat [18] . We envisage the investigation of q-bargaining with methods characteristic to quantum quasi-equilibrium stochastic processes. This should result in formulation of nonlinear equations governing the dynamics of changes in risk and spin temperatures. But investigation of q-bargaining without the underlying thermostat ÊÏ that dictates market prices seems to be to abstract for application in economics. It is customary that the polarization state in bargaining with the Rest of the World is fixed in advance (e.g. sellers price). Therefore nontrivial description of changes in spin temperature of q-bargaining may be obtained only in models with at least three parties: A, B and ÊÏ with A and B using different strategies with respect to themselves than to ÊÏ. Such a minimal model is fourdimensional and describes risk temperatures of A, B and ÊÏ and spin temperature of the q-bargaining between A and B.
Note that spin temperature resembles another Legendre multiplier connected to portfolio managing and introduced and discussed in Ref. [19] . Such coupled to the logarithmic rate of return portfolio temperature (third kind of temperature of economic process!) allows to compare skills of investors active in different market or market conditions and not necessary during the same intervals. For an aggressive market activity the logarithmic rate of return cease to be additive and portfolio temperatures acquire nonzero imaginary parts [12] . The considered above q-bargaining between Alice and ÊÏ with both polarizations may be perceived as multiple buying and selling of some financial asset with normal distribution of quotation of logarithm of its price. So we are able to determine the portfolio temperature of Alice strategy. Such thermodynamics of q-bargaining between Alice and ÊÏ would be presented elsewhere.
Final remarks
If Bill intervene in q-bargaining between Alice and Bob so that first transaction is made between Alice and Bill and the second between Bob and Bill then we may call the process complex q-bargaining between Alice and Bob. The middlemen (e.g. Bill) are filters from the quantum mechanical point of view. In complex q-bargaining one may give up clearing of the intermediate transactions. This would result in superposition of amplitudes characterizing profits (logarithm of prices) and polarizations of complex q-bargaining.
The discussed connection between q-bargaining and condensed matter physics suggest that q-bargaining might be performed with help of quantum automata. If Penrose is right in his suggestions concerning the process of thinking [22] the phenomenon of q-bargaining might be possible to detect in present markets where transactions are made due to non-computational algorithms. Does a middleman performs the role of a "polarizator" facilitating making transactions?
If we consider more realistic market of several assets then q-bargaining will concern many price-like parameters ½ ¾
. So q-bargaining may be used for modeling negotiations based on multi-criterion valuation of the offer.
Ancient Greeks, already 800 years BC, knew that the polarization ¼½ is more profitable for Alice, that is she accepts the transaction instead of proposing the price. Heziod writes [23] that Zeus accepting the method one divides the other chooses in his deal with Prometheus, let the human to divide.
